The front page splash in The Lawyer yesterday was that EC3 law firms would be doing well out of the forthcoming “tidal wave of litigation“.

Certain of the quotes were remarkably insensitive. The comment that”the London market’s walking around with a smile on its face” from one senior partner managed to combine smugness and hubris in equal measures. Even if that were correct, I’m not sure that I’d want to crow about it so openly.

But I am not at all convinced that it is correct.

People say that this is the early 90s all over again. That certainly was a boom time for the initially rather select band of law firms active in EC3. I cut my teeth on a plethora of E&O cases, in all fields, and there was certainly no shortage of work.

However, times have changed since then, and it’s worth bearing in mind the following factors that put us in a different place this time round:

1. Changes in caselaw: Back in the early 90s, there was not a well-established body of caselaw on the issues typically in dispute; now there is. So there is less to argue about.

2. Banks are not driving litigation: Last time around the banks were a major driver of much of the litigation against surveyors, which itself constituted a very high proportion of all E&O claims. Now, the banks will probably sit tight and keep their heads down: with a pile of our cash from the bail-out, and a perception of bankers as Public Enemy No. 1, they will not feel quite the same need to go after funds lost in shaky deals, especially when to do so might expose their own perhaps questionable practices to the public gaze.

3. Increased professionalism within insurers: Since the 90s, insurers have become very much more professional in what they write and, more importantly, in how they manage and control claims. Back then, it was comparatively rare to have in-house claims counsel or solicitors amongst your claims team; now, it is the norm. Insurers are much more capable now of triaging claims and filtering out the ones that need to go on to external solicitors. And when cases do go out to lawyers, the insurers’ claims team tends to be much more pro-active about managing them and getting results–gone are the days when a one year qualified solicitor could simply put the case on auto-pilot and then settle very shortly before trial, collecting money every time the case passed Go.

4. Changes in the Court system: Reforms in the way the courts handle cases has also had a huge effort, with claims issued in the Commercial Court dropping from (from memory) about 147,000 in 1995 to about 14,700 in 2005. Fast-track procedures, the pre-action protocols, increased and interventionist case management: all of these have had a powerful effect in weeding out unmeritorious claims (and defences).

4. Circumstances -v- Claims: Anecdotal evidence tends to support the view that, whilst the notification of circumstances has shot through the roof, that is not as yet translating into anything like the same number of claims. Claims will rise in time, no doubt, but I don’t think we’re ever going to see them anywhere near matching notifications.

5. Too many lawyers: Back in the Good Old Days, there were really only a few specialist law firms around who worked significantly with the EC3 market. Once others perceived it as a gravy train, the vultures descended and a whole raft of firms suddenly began to claim an expertise in the field. While a few fell by the wayside for various reasons–no expertise, marketing to the ‘wrong’ sector and getting killed on rates etc–there are still enough around claiming specialism to make it something of a buyer’s market.

We are undoubtedly going to see a rise in claims and a concomitant rise in work for solicitors advising the insurance industry. That is almost inevitable in a recession, for basic human reasons–when the money dries up, people frequently have to litigate to try and recoup legitimate monies (say, an architect who is not paid his fees, suing his client and then facing a counterclaim many times the value of those fees) or, fraudulently, they make false claims against insurers.

However, save in one area, I don’t think we’re going to see a “tidal wave of litigation” for all the reasons above. That one area? You may find some measure of ironic amusement in that the one field that really does seem to be motoring is…(wait for it)…solicitors’ negligence.

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In a 3-0 decision the Court of Appeal has today ruled decisively that it is beyond the power of any local authority to set up and participate in a mutual insurer.

The unanimous decision of their Lordships in the case of RMP -v- Brent [2009] EWCA Civ 490 not only reinforces but goes further than the original twin decisions, Part 1 (on vires) and Part 2 (on procurement — see below). At first instance, the Court found that Brent had not shown that it had properly considered whether its area would benefit from the supposed savings to be had from participating in LAML. The Court of Appeal has now held that question to be irrelevant — all that counts is whether an authority can participate in a mutual insurer such as LAML, and the short answer is that it cannot.

RMP is an open-market supplier of insurance services to the local authority sector. LAML is a mutual insurer set up by a number of London local authorities to provide, on a monopoly basis, insurance to London authorities. RMP were invited to tender by Brent, who then abandoned the process and awarded the contract to LAML. RMP contested this decision in two ways: first, by arguing that it was beyond any authority’s powers to set up and participate in such an insurer (the vires case); second, by contesting Brent’s decision to award the contract to LAML outside the public procurement rules, which Brent did in reliance on a European decision known as Teckal (the procurement case).

Harrow and LAML were Interested Parties, and fully legally represented, in both the original hearing and before the Court of Appeal.

The vires case

Brent relied on two statutes: s.2 of the Local Government Act 2000 (the so-called ‘well-being’ power), and on s.111 of the Local Government Act 1972.

The first argument, under s.2 LGA 2000, is that an authority is permitted to do anything which might improve the well-being of its area. Brent said that the money that it hoped to save via its participation in LAML would be put to the well-being of the area for which it is responsible and hence that its participation in LAML was thus legitimate. At first instance, Brent failed in this argument because it could not show that it had properly considered whether any such savings would, in fact, be applied thus. This part of the judgment allowed other authorities, and LAML, to claim that the decision did not apply to them, but rather applied to the particular facts of Brent’s decision to participate in LAML.

That claim has now been firmly squashed. In the leading judgment, Pill LJ said that the s.2 well-being power

“…does not extend to a power to enter into the complex and somewhat speculative attempt to save money which is the mainspring of the LAML arrangement. The guarantees and degree of speculation involved, in my view take the activity proposed beyond what Parliament intended by the well-being clause” (emphasis added).

That view was shared by Moore-Bick LJ (paras. 180-182) and Hughes LJ (para. 255(ii)).

Section 111 of the 1972 Act allows an authority to do anything that is ‘incidental’ to the carrying out of its normal functions. Those normal functions might include running schools and highways in its area, and it is plainly incidental to those functions to buy insurance to allow the authority to operate safely. To buy insurance from LAML is, it was argued, simply a form of purchasing that insurance.

The judge at first instance dismissed this defence, and the Court of Appeal has done the same. Moore-Bick LJ commented that

“…participation in LAML cannot… be treated in the round as merely one recognised way of obtaining insurance with nothing to distinguish it for present purposes from more usual forms of commercial insurance… In my view membership of the company and the obligations to which it gives rise involve a significant departure from conventional insurance arrangements and are properly to be viewed in this context as incidental to the incidental.” (para. 170)

Importantly, the Court of Appeal resoundingly rejected the idea that the LAML arrangement could be saved by relying on some form of associated risk management service. Lord Justice Moore-Bick held that

“it could [not] be said that the benefits in terms of risk management were sufficient to justify participation in LAML as incidental to those functions.” (para. 172)

The procurement case

Even had it been within Brent’s power to participate in LAML, it breached the Public Contracts Regulations 2006 by failing to award the contract by means of open tender. Brent admitted the fact, but argued that it was entitled to do so by reason of the so-called Teckal exemption (named after the EU decision of the same name). The exemption applies where the authority contracts with a third party over which it exerts the same degree of control as it has over one of its internal departments and where that third party does most of its work for the authority.

The Court of Appeal found there was insufficient control by Brent (and effectively by any other authority) over LAML for the Teckal exemption to apply. Lord Justice Pill observed (at para. 131) that “the nature of the business, and the possibly differing interests of different authorities and affiliates, are antithetic to the necessary local authority control.” Therefore, any authority seeking to join LAML would have to hold a proper open, competitive tender for the award of the insurance contract (though the point is plainly moot, given that no authority has power to participate in LAML).

Since Brent awarded the contract to LAML without the requisite tender process, their Lordships held that RMP is entitled to damages from Brent as a result.

The shared services agenda

None of this affects the government’s shared services agenda, which remains vigorously in force. Indeed, Lord Justice Pill makes specific reference in his judgment (paras. 114-120) to the government’s aim in the well-being power—to reverse the “traditionally cautious approach” to “innovation and joint action”.

But his Lordship also went on to stress that Parliament had not given carte blanche to local authorities to do whatever they wish, that there must be limits on what was permissible and that “Analysis of the expression “promote the well-being” is still required to decide what the limits are”.

The limits are still there; the LAML arrangement simply lay beyond them.

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In the very recent (20 May 2009) case of Flexsys America L.P. -v- XL Insurance Co Ltd, the UK Commercial Court considered some interesting issues of overlap between different parts of the same overall programme, and in particular whether reinstatement provisions in the master cover could be used to provide extra cover for the same claim. (Short answer: No)

The Claimant, Flexsys, is the US subsidiary of a global corporation based in Belgium. It bought a master policy providing cover, including to its subsidiaries, in excess of any local policies issued to those subsidiaries.

Flexsys was insured locally under a CGL policy, and incurred legal costs of over US$2m in defending a claim brought in the US by a Korean company. It settled with local policy carriers (who expressly denied liability) for the policy limit of US$1 million, and then sought to recover the balance of its legal costs from the master policy insurers.

However, cover under the master policy was narrower than under the local policy. Memorandum E (the “Drop Down Clause”) of the master policy provided that:
>In the event of partial exhaustion of a local policy this Policy will pay in excess of the reduced underlying Limit of Indemnity. In the event of total exhaustion of a local policy this Policy will continue in force as the underlying insurance subject to the terms Exceptions and Conditions of the particular local Policy.

Flexsys argued that, the local policy being exhausted, the master policy should drop down to provide further cover for this claim on the same terms as the local policy (save for limits).

Tomlinson J sensibly rejected this argument. He held that such drop-down cover did not apply where a claim was recoverable under the local policy but not under the master policy. There would have to have been some express wording to allow for recovery where the master policy terms were narrower than those of the local policy. The true intention of the second part of the Drop Down Clause, he found, was to provide “a reinstatement of the local policy to be available to meet subsequent claims….It means that in the case of either partial or total exhaustion there is cover available from the ground up for the next claim” (emphasis added).

His Lordship also rejected Flexsys’s argument that it made no commercial sense for it to have chosen to have only US$1 million of cover in certain circumstances. Such a case was meaningless, he held, without considering further commercial questions, such as the cost of buying further cover and balancing that additional cost against the perceived risk involved.

Finally, the judge considered whether the local policy gave Flexsys cover for the legal expenses which it had incurred—it did not. Cover for ‘product disparagement’ was subject to Exclusion 2, where the insured had acted knowing that its actions would violate the rights of a third party, and/or that the material published was false. The Korean company’s claims were that Flexsys had intimidated customers into boycotting it.

>In my judgment the allegation made against Flexsys is not that it said things which turned out to be incorrect which conduct might therefore have occurred through mere negligence or recklessness but rather that Flexsys set out deliberately to injure KKPC by saying things about it and its products which it knew to be untrue. Liability in respect of such conduct is plainly excluded from the ambit of the local policy cover.

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AON are warning that fraud is on the rise and that insurance is going to face increasing claims from environmental threats, terrorism and product recalls.

They also think nano-tech is going to bite insurers.

I’d agree with fraud.

Longer term, I think the environment is going to be an issue — it already is, obviously — but I think the market will find ways to deal with that.

NOTE: Munich Re say that they expect that insurance products for “new” liability risks will emerge in the future, possibly covering risks such as failure to warn/report/inform, conspiracy, wrong reaction to emergency situations and even improper claims handling. They also comment that the question of whether claims emerge through general liability or product liability insurance may continue to evolve and may become more frequent. “Such covers are intended to extend only to emissions caused by fortuitous events and not to emissions caused in the normal course of operations or due to wilful action.” They also say note that what is considered “normal” may call for redefinition by the courts and in corporations’ code of conduct regarding energy and environmental practices.

Terrorism? Hmm, not sure about that since it’s pretty easy and standard to exclude it.

What about product recalls? Again, I’m not sure that I see why there should be an increase there all of a sudden, unless they are linking it to nano-tech, but even then I’m sceptical about whether nano really is going to be the horror that many are talking it up to be at present. I’m writing a paper on the issue at present, and the gossipy press is full of half-truths and junk science, which makes for a less than convincing case.

I’ll put the ‘nano-review’ up when done.

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Insurers should be wary of reliance on an apparently iron-clad warranty. Context is critical, and the courts will look beyond the mere words to discover the true intentions of the parties.

In Pratt -v- Aigaion Insurance Company [2008] EWCA Civ 1314, the Court of Appeal held that insurers were not entitled to rely on a warranty to decline indemnity. Rather, their Lordships said, one must look to what a reasonable man would have understood the parties to mean by the clause in the situation they were in at the time of the contract.

Mr Pratt owned a trawler which suffered fire damage while berthed. At the time, no crew were on board. The insurance contract with Aigaion warranted

“Owner and/or Owner’s experienced skipper on board and in charge at all times and one experienced crew member”.

Insurers argued that the terms of the warranty were unambiguous, there had been a breach and hence they were entitled to decline cover; the owners said that this interpretation ignored the fact that the clause plainly applied only to periods when the vessel was navigating or working and, if applied literally, would lead to absurd results.

At first instance, Mackie J found in insurers’ favour and refused leave to appeal. Sir Paul Kennedy did give leave, saying “the words ‘at all times’ cannot have been intended to be read literally”.

Sir Anthony Clarke, the Master of the Rolls, noted that “any clause in a contract must be construed having regard to its context within the contract, which must in turn be set out in its surrounding circumstances or factual matrix”, and cited Hoffman LJ’s comments in ICS -v- West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 897: “The meaning of words is a matter of dictionaries and grammars; the meaning of the document is what the parties using those words against the relevant background would reasonably have been understood to mean”.

While there is no conceptual limit to what might be relevant, the emphasis should be on the conventional above the fanciful (Hoffman LJ in BCCI -v- Ali [2001] UKHL 8), and the commercial over the literal (Steyn LJ in Sirius Insurance -v- FAI [2004] UKHL 54). Attention is to be placed on the actual language used, applying the ‘ordinary’ meaning of the words in question while bearing in mind the sometimes inevitable use of specialist vocabulary (Mustill LJ in Charter Re -v- Fagan [1997] AC 313).

Their Lordships found for Mr Pratt. While accepting that the court “must not invent a new bargain for the parties”, Sir Anthony found that “the underlying purpose of the warranty…was to protect the vessel in circumstances in which at least two members of the crew…could be expected to be on board.”

Those circumstances, Sir Anthony held, were probably when the vessel was navigating, manoeuvring and perhaps landing her catch, and this was a necessary qualification to the “at all times” on which insurers pinned their case. How far that qualification went was open to question, but the clause must then be decided contra proferentem, i.e. in this case against insurers.

Reinforcing the main judgment, Stanley Burnton LJ noted that the incorporated trawler wording provided cover in circumstances where it would be unlikely or impossible for any crew to be on board, such as when the vessel was in a shed or being dismantled. That, of itself, indicated that “at all times” cannot have meant “at all times” stricto sensu.

For insurers, the message is clear. While the courts will look to the words of the agreement, they are concerned above all with giving effect to the true intentions of the parties. In a clash between the two, the latter will prevail.

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It’s deja vu all over again, at least for those of us who remember the last Big Recession.

The FSA has been reviewing advice given to customers wanting to switch into a personal pension or SIPP. Having looked at 500 cases across 30 firms, they found that 16% of clients had received unsuitable advice. 25% of firms involved gave suitable advice consistently but for another quarter, they gave inappropriate advice in 33% or more of the cases.

The FSA is writing to over 4,500 firms to lay down the law and saying what steps it expects to see implemented by by Q3 2009. Failure will involve ‘further action’.

Defective advice included

* switches involving extra costs without good reason;
* recommendations that did not match the customer’s attitude to risk and their personal circumstances;
* failure to explain the need for, or put in place, ongoing reviews when these were necessary, and
* loss of benefits from existing pension schemes without good reason.

As I said, just like the 90s.

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The Guardian reports on a Ryanair emergency landing which put 16 in hospital in Limoges.

Most people, I think, while scared witless, would probably expect that every so often this sort of thing “just happens”. What is markedly less reassuring, somehow (though I can’t quite put my finger on why) is that few of the oxygen masks were apparently working.

Pen Hadow, the Arctic explorer, was on the flight. According to him (and the Grauniad):

“The next thing the oxygen masks were dropping. My highest priority was to get a mask on to my son who was sitting next to me in a bemused and frightened state. We were descending for about five minutes from what I assume was 30,000 or 40,000ft to 8,000ft. As we landed we saw fire engines every quarter of a mile down the runway.”

Hadow…said a number of oxygen masks inside the cabin failed to work properly. “Mine wasn’t filling up with oxygen and neither was my son’s,” he said. “He was hyperventilating.”…

“From where I was sitting I could see about 20 masks and only a few of them were inflating,” Hadow said. “It was extremely variable as to who got oxygen in their masks, and the cabin crew didn’t seem to know what to do.”

Hadow is probably not the sort to flap (sorry) in an emergency, and his account rings true. Can’t see why he should make it up, either.

One rather hopes that Ryanair will check ALL their bits and pieces. On any view, that is the sort of thing that insurers should be concerned about. If it’s true, it tends to give an impression of slipshodness that is likely to leave passengers–and insurers–a little nervous, especially coming on the heels of the Madrid tragedy.

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We won the second phase of our case for RMP against Brent LBC, Harrow LBC and LAML today.

Here is the Press Release. As before, I hope to put up a more comprehensive guide to what the judgment means shortly.

Another resounding victory for Risk Management Partners in second part of landmark case against Brent LBC and others

In the second Judgment in a landmark case, the High Court has today found that Brent LBC acted unlawfully in side-stepping EU-regulated procurement procedures and awarding its insurance services direct to the London Authorities Mutual Limited (LAML), a mutual insurer for London borough councils. The effects of this Judgment will be felt throughout the local government arena as it confirms that all councils must adhere strictly to the tender framework.

Risk Management Partners (RMP), a company providing insurance services to local authorities, pursued the test case against Brent after Brent abandoned the EU-regulated public procurement process and awarded the contract for its insurance services to LAML, outside the tender framework.

Today’s decision follows an earlier ruling in the case which found, in principle, that no local authority can participate in such a mutual if it does so to save money on its insurance.

Jolyon Patten, partner at national law firm Halliwells LLP, who acted for RMP, comments:

“The Judgment is a tremendous success for RMP and will be a relief to all those providing insurance services to the local government sector. LAML has never explained how its operating as a monopoly could benefit authorities. These Regulations are there precisely to ensure transparency, fairness and competition in public procurement, and this decision underlines the fundamental importance of those principles to the local government sector.”

RMP’s Kaz Janowicz said:

“We are delighted at the Court’s findings. Our sole aim in this action has been to get back to a level playing-field. We are happy to compete with LAML, or indeed, anyone—all we ask is an equal opportunity to do so, and the Court has now given us just that.”

EU Regulations stipulate that public contracts above a certain value must be put out to open competitive tender. An authority may be able to side-step this process in limited circumstances under the so-called Teckal exemption (after an Italian case of that name). To do so, it must exercise over the contracting party a control similar to that which it exercises over its own departments. In the case of LAML, Lord Justice Burnton found that the authorities participating in LAML did not have the necessary control, pointing to the independence of LAML from any of its member authorities.

The second stage of the Teckal test is that the other contracting party must carry out the essential part of its activities with the controlling local authority or authorities. Given his conclusion on control, the judge did not consider it necessary to find on this point.

The judge also commented that these same issues are “likely to arise whenever a London borough is considering placing or renewing an insurance contract of sufficient size with LAML”.

RMP understands that as a result of these decisions, Brent has now obtained insurance outside LAML.

This decision follows the earlier decision of Lord Justice Burnton on the vires part of the case, in which he found that Brent had acted without authority in participating in LAML and that there was a “fundamental difference between…participation in LAML and normal commercial insurance”. Brent were not only buying insurance; they were providing insurance to others, taking on potentially unlimited liabilities to LAML in the event of future shortfalls. The judge found that the provision of insurance to others was “not incidental to the discharge of any function of a local authority” and thus fell outside the scope of s.111 of the Local Government Act 1972.

Brent further failed in their case on s.2 of the Local Government Act 2000, the so-called “well-being” power. The mere fact that Brent expected to save money on its insurance premiums did not justify participating in LAML since it did not promote the well-being of the area of Brent. This applies to all councils participating in LAML; an expectation that money might be saved is not enough to make participation lawful.

There is no question of these decisions putting the shared services agenda at risk. As the judge said at paragraph 84 of the vires decision, “if a local authority has power to do something, it may do so in association with other authorities. But this does not assist if what is being done is outwith the powers of that authority.”

Additional information:

• LAML and Harrow, who were in a similar position to Brent, originally joined the action as Interested Parties to the Judicial Review claim. Since no relief was sought against them in either claim, no finding was made specifically against them.
• Brent, Harrow and LAML obtained leave to appeal this judgment, and have already commenced appeal proceedings in the vires action.
• RMP were awarded costs.
• The full text of Judgment can be found here: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2008/1094.html

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On April 22nd 2008 Lord Justice Stanley Burnton handed down his judgment in R (on the application of Risk Management Partners) –v– the Council of the London Borough of Brent [2008] EWHC 692 (Admin).

LAML, who were an interested party in the case, say that the court threw “out claims from the private sector that councils are acting beyond their designated powers”.

In fact the Court found the very opposite—Brent had no power to establish or participate in LAML, to become a member of it, or to make a paid up or guaranteed capital contribution to LAML either under section 111 of the Local Government Act 1972 or section 2 of the Local Government Act 2000.

The Court granted RMP a declaration to that effect and ordered Brent to pay RMP’s costs of the claim.

LAML go on to say that “Harrow Council was also named in the case, but no finding of ultra vires was made against Harrow”. Like LAML, Harrow was merely an interested party in the case, not a defendant. The reason no finding was made against it—or against LAML— is because their actions were not the subject of this claim for judicial review.

LAML also claim that “the Judgment states that authorities do have powers, pursuant to well-being powers under s2 of the Local Government Act 2000 to join LAML.” That is simply incorrect. The judge said no such thing.

What he did find was that if a local authority bases its decision to enter LAML on what savings it might make on its insurance premiums then its decision will be unlawful under the “well-being” power in s.2 Local Government Act 2000 (paragraph 114 of the judgment). In that regard, it is worth noting that LAML continues to broadcast its primary message to authorities, that “it aims to save its growing membership up to 15 per cent per annum on their insurance premiums over the next five years”.

The only other comments by the judge in respect of the section 2 well-being power were made obiter and without having heard argument: “I think that a local authority could pursuant to its well-being power enter into a contract with a company for the provision of advice as to the avoidance of damage to property in its area through fire or accident, or for the avoidance of accidents to persons living or working there. In other words, a local authority could purchase what has been referred to as risk management services.” If so, he thought, it could contract with the company for the provision of such services and insurance, and provide guarantees and financial assistance to the company for that purpose pursuant to section 2(4).

But whatever the merits of these views expressed obiter, the simple fact is that LAML is not such a company: its principal object is to provide insurance for London local authorities. It is no part of LAML’s objects to provide risk management services in respect of property or persons living or working in any particular local authority area generally. And neither are the capital contributions required by LAML to meet the FSA’s requirements for its business, which is insuring local authorities themselves, made for such purposes.

Finally, it may be noted that LAML sought permission to appeal against the very judgment that it now claims is a “vindication of LAML’s actions”.

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I am staggered by this. According to the British Lung Federation:

* Less than a third of tradespeople are aware asbestos exposure can cause cancer
* Only 12% of tradespeople know asbestos exposure can kill them
* Nearly a third (30%) wrongly believe most asbestos has been removed from UK buildings
* Three quarters (74%) have had no training in how to deal with asbestos.

The full report is here. You might want to have a look at the Key Findings, on page 10, in particular.

Insurers have real cause for concern here, particularly when almost half (47%) the workforce say their employers have done nothing to keep them informed about the risks of asbestos and what to do if they encounter it.

At present I am involved in a ‘difference of views’ about a book of business that went into run-off in 1972. It covered employers in the UK against the usual perils and after an initial run of general accident claims, industrial deafness and so on, the big driver has been mesothelioma. 35 years after going into run-off, the claims experience has not yet peaked.

This graphic, from an article in Nature and in turn taken from the British Journal of Cancer (2005) 92, 587-593, shows the rough shape of the loss experience in mesothelioma in general (i.e. not just in the case with which I am currently involved).

Over the years, I’ve done quite a lot of work involving asbestosis. I recall ploughing through some documents one day and seeing a letter from a Name at Lloyd’s, Lord N_____, to his member’s agent mentioning that he’d “heard of something called asbestosis at a drinks party” and was it anything to worry about? This was in 1977. Bland assurances followed and the old buffer didn’t pull out.

And yet industry was aware as long ago as the late 19th century that there was at the very least something not quite right about asbestos. Connections were made with ill-health and sickness between the wars and the government was perfectly well aware of the issues by no later than the Second World War.

So why is it still such a problem now? Why do people know so little? I’ve no answer to this. According to the survey, “Nearly one in five (18%) think asbestos is no longer a serious issue, and more than a third (34%) mistakenly believe most asbestos has been removed.” Yet bizarrely, only “a quarter (26%) consider themselves not very well informed about asbestos”.

Surely it’s time for a campaign of public education, supported and encouraged by the government, to inform workers exposed to the dangers of working with asbestos. Meso, in particular, is a horrible, horrible disease and extremely painful in its final stages. In a civilized information society, with a long experience of dealing with the effects of asbestosis, it must be little short of criminally negligent that this situation should exist at all and it should certainly not be allowed to exist any longer.

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